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The Heck Conundrum: Why Federal Courts Should 
Not Overextend the Heck v. Humphrey Preclusion 
Doctrine 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sirens screamed as the officers turned into an alley after the 
stolen white Honda. The couple fleeing pursuit had nowhere to go. 
Suddenly, the two felons ditched the Honda and ran towards a 
maroon pick-up truck with officers quick on their heels. Law 
enforcement intercepted the couple before they were able to reach 
the truck, but after an intense brawl, the fleeing felons entered the 
truck, started its engine, and rammed the police-car barricade that 
blocked their escape. Quickly reversing, perhaps to attempt another 
run at the blockade, one of the felons backed the truck toward where 
one of the officers stood. In response, the officer raised his gun and 
fired on the driver, killing him. The other felon was secured, 
arrested, charged, and convicted of assault with a deadly weapon on 
a police officer. 
This dramatization recounts the facts in the Ninth Circuit’s recent 
case Beets v. County of Los Angeles.1 In Beets, the deceased felon’s 
parents brought a § 1983 action2 against the shooting officer and 
the county claiming that excessive force was used in the attempt to 
arrest the deceased felon.3 The federal court of appeals affirmed the 
district court’s holding that Heck v. Humphrey barred the grieving 
parents from seeking relief in a federal forum.4 Heck is a 1994 
Supreme Court decision holding that a federal court cannot hear a 
state prisoner’s § 1983 claim for damages based on a violation of 
federal rights if doing so would necessarily imply the invalidity of the 
prisoner’s conviction or confinement, unless that prisoner can first 
show that the conviction was overturned.5 This important rule is 
known as the “Heck bar,”6 and it is intended to preserve comity 
 
 1. 669 F.3d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 2. For an explanation regarding § 1983 causes of action, see infra Part II. 
 3. Beets, 669 F.3d at 1040. 
 4. Id. 
 5. 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). 
 6. See, e.g., Beets, 669 F.3d at 1042. 
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between state and federal courts by preventing a federal cause of 
action that would jeopardize the basis of a state conviction.7 
Consequently, the parents in Beets argued that Heck did not 
apply to their action because neither they nor their deceased son 
were convicted of any crime that the § 1983 claim might 
undermine.8 The court instead pointed to the deceased’s 
coconspirator and stated that, because she had been convicted in 
relation to the same occurrence, any remedy the parents might 
secure via § 1983 would necessarily imply the invalidity of her 
conviction.9 Thus, no federal forum was available to hear the 
parents’ federal claim.10 
The Beets case highlights an important question left unanswered 
by Heck and its progeny—are individuals precluded from seeking § 
1983 relief if success in that action would be inconsistent with a co-
felon’s conviction or confinement?11 Currently, the circuits are split 
over the closely related issue of whether a federal court may entertain 
a § 1983 claim if the petitioner has no access to habeas relief because 
she is either released from custody or was not sentenced to 
incarceration.12 And the limited available scholarship regarding the 
Heck bar seems to focus on this topic.13 Yet, there is cause for 
 
 7. See infra Part III.A. 
 8. Beets, 669 F.3d at 1042. 
 9. Id. at 1048. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Although the existing literature does address how Heck should or should not apply 
to persons who do not qualify for habeas relief, see infra note 13, there is significantly less 
discussion on how Heck implicates noncriminal plaintiffs, or, specifically, those petitioners 
who bring § 1983 claims on behalf of themselves and deceased persons when there has been 
no conviction in their regard. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See Jack M. Beermann, Common Law Elements of the Section 1983 Action, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 695, 714 (1997) (anticipating Heck’s “potential to create significant new 
complications in § 1983 litigation and [to] impose substantial new obstacles on § 1983 
plaintiffs”); Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey: Should the Favorable Termination 
Rule Apply to Individuals Who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?, 121 HARV. L. REV. 868, 880–84 
(2008) [hereinafter Note] (arguing that Heck should not apply to petitioners who do not have 
access to habeas relief); Thomas Stephen Schneidau, Note, Favorable Termination After 
Freedom: Why Heck’s Rule Should Reign, Within Reason, 70 LA. L. REV. 647, 669 (2010) 
(arguing that Heck should apply to non-habeas-eligible plaintiffs because of important state 
sovereignty issues). Other pieces discuss the implications of Heck v. Humphrey in various areas 
of the law. See John Stanfield Buford, Comment, When the Heck Does this Claim Accrue? Heck 
v. Humphrey’s Footnote Seven and § 1983 Damages Suits for Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1493, 1502–03 (2001) (discussing the impact of Heck on petitions 
arguing illegal search); Benjamin Vetter, Comment, Habeas, Section 1983, and Post-Conviction 
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concern in the fact that an even more peripheral plaintiff, one whose 
federal claim would not necessarily undermine another party’s state 
conviction, may also be Heck barred from federal court.14 
Accordingly, this Comment contributes to the current literature by 
highlighting this consequence of adopting an expansive view of 
Heck, which half the circuits have done, and offers an alternative 
method of preclusion where appropriate. 
This Comment argues that a petitioner bringing a § 1983 claim 
for damages in federal court should generally not be prohibited from 
doing so even if another party’s criminal conviction rests on the same 
set of facts that give rise to the civil action because the § 1983 
claimant’s success will not necessarily imply the invalidity of the 
other’s criminal conviction. Of course, if a court determines that 
privity between the claimant and the co-felon satisfies collateral 
estoppel requirements,15 then that analysis may create a bar to the 
action.16 But absent collateral estoppel, the petitioner’s action should 
not be precluded merely because success could result in inconsistent 
findings by juries or judges regarding the petitioner and a 
convicted person. 
This approach is favorable because it limits the scope of the Heck 
bar to those instances when a petitioner would actually undermine 
her own conviction if she were successful in the § 1983 action, which 
 
Access to DNA Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587 (2004) (arguing that Heck should not bar 
DNA requests from prisoners); Paul D. Vink, Note, The Emergence of Divergence: The Federal 
Court’s Struggle to Apply Heck v. Humphrey to § 1983 Claims for Illegal Searches, 35 IND. L. 
REV. 1085 (2002) (evaluating the implications of Heck on Fourth Amendment searches). The 
most surprising observation about this area of literature is the lack of professional pieces. 
Nearly every piece published that analyzes Heck v. Humphrey comes from notes and comments. 
The research surrounding Heck v. Humphrey would benefit greatly from 
professional contributions. 
 14. See infra Part VI. 
 15. Collateral estoppel and res judicata are related but independent preclusion concepts. 
47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 464 (2006). Res judicata prohibits a party or its privies from 
relitigating a previously adjudicated cause of action. Id. § 473. Since a civil action cannot be 
brought in a criminal trial, a civil § 1983 cause of action will not have been previously 
adjudicated. Therefore, res judicata will never preclude a § 1983 claim that arises from the 
same facts on which a criminal conviction rests. Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, arises 
when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined in a valid and final prior proceeding. Id. § 
487. Thus, collateral estoppel could preclude a § 1983 claim if the issue of that claim was fully 
adjudicated in a prior criminal trial and the party against whom it is applied was a party or in 
privity with a party to the trial. 
 16. While Heck is intended to protect state convictions from being collaterally attacked 
through the federal court system, it is a separate and distinct doctrine from collateral estoppel. 
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was the purpose of the bar’s creation when the Court initially 
decided Heck.17 Broadening this scope is detrimental because it keeps 
potentially valid federal claims out of federal court in situations 
where a state forum may not be available or sufficient. Also, 
imposing the Heck bar on petitioners like the Beets plaintiffs 
complicates the Heck analysis for future courts because it adds 
elements that do not belong. Indeed, it confuses the differences 
between issue preclusion and Heck preclusion. 
To support these arguments, Part II provides a brief explanation 
of § 1983 and habeas corpus relief. Part III explains how the Court 
has dealt with the relationship between these two statutes in the 
context of Heck v. Humphrey and subsequent cases. Part IV presents 
the current circuit split and its relationship to the question posed in 
this piece. Part V studies the Beets case in detail to provide context 
for the analysis that follows in Part VI. Part VI identifies the 
troubling results that come from extending the Heck bar in the 
manner adopted by the Beets court. This section also explains how 
cases may still be properly barred by collateral estoppel when 
appropriate. Part VII concludes. 
II. A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF § 1983 AND HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF 
The two major doctrinal players in this Comment, 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 and the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, are the basis 
for thousands of federal complaints each year. In 2011, over 16,000 
habeas petitions were filed, which alone accounted for 6% of all 
private cases submitted to federal district courts.18 The number of § 
1983 claims is also impressive.19 The volume of cases that federal 
 
 17. See infra Part III.A. 
 18. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES 2011: TABLE C-3, at 35 (2011), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudi
ciary/2011/Dec-11/C03Dec11.pdf (showing that 16,195 habeas corpus petitions were filed 
out of 243,182 total private civil cases). About 6,000 habeas petitions are appealed to circuit 
courts, making up about 30% of all federal question appeals. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES 2011: TABLE B-7, AT 19 (2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2011/Dec-11/B07Dec11.pdf. 
 19. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES 2011: TABLE C-3, at 
35 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/ 
StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2011/Dec-11/C03Dec11.pdf. The total number of 
civil rights cases brought by both prisoners and nonprisoners was over 59,000 or 
approximately 25% of all private cases heard in federal district court. Granted, not all civil rights 
cases rely on § 1983 for a private cause of action, but many do. 
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courts receive dealing with these two statutes, and the significance of 
the rights they protect, make it important to understand their 
relation to each other. 
Both statutes originally were enacted in the Reconstruction Era 
to provide federal remedies for state violations of federal rights. 
During this time, Congress worked to align the justice system with 
the recently passed post–Civil War amendments, which resulted in 
substantial federal checks on state power.20 The Habeas Corpus Act 
of 1867 was novel because it authorized federal courts to hear 
petitions from prisoners held in state custody.21 This statute was 
initially drafted in a way that encouraged state prisoners to call on 
the federal government to correct missteps by state actors.22 
Congress later amended the statute to require a petitioner to first 
exhaust all potential state remedies before seeking habeas review in 
federal court.23 Habeas affords a prisoner a release from custody if 
she successfully demonstrates that all state avenues for redress have 
failed and that her federal rights were violated.24 
Originally part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,25 § 198326 was 
enacted due to the conditions in the South at the time of its 
 
 20. See LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 41–42 (3d ed. 2009) (explaining that 
post–Civil War constructional amendments and various civil rights statutes extended the 
jurisdiction and the remedial authority of federal courts). 
 21. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (identifying defendants subject to 
suit or prosecution in state court as having access to federal court through a writ of 
habeas corpus). 
 22. Id. (calling it the federal court clerk’s “duty” to issue a writ of habeas corpus if a 
state prisoner meets the requirements and finding it the “duty” of the marshal to obey that 
writ and deliver the state prisoner to federal court). 
 23. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 967 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
2254). See Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle: Continued Frustrating Conflict Between the 
Civil Rights and Habeas Corpus Remedies for State Prisoners, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 95–96 
(1988). Professor Schwartz explains that the policy behind the exhaustion requirement was 
twofold. First, it was a nod to state comity—Congress gives state courts the first opportunity to 
correct any constitutional violation. Second, the requirement preserves the relationship 
between state and federal courts by avoiding any unnecessary disturbance, which in turn also 
balances federalism interests against the need for the writ of habeas corpus in situations where 
the State has violated federal law. Id. Beyond this, Congress demonstrated its respect for state 
remedies by obliging state prisoners to first turn there before seeking federal redress. Id. 
at 102. 
 24. See Schwartz, supra note 23, at 104–05 (explaining that a release from custody is the 
heart of habeas relief, particularly since it does not attempt to compensate for past suffering). 
 25. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (“[A]ny person who, under 
color of any [state law], shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the 
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passage.27 The Act attempted to hold State officers, who were unable 
or unwilling to protect the newly freed slaves, accountable for 
evenhandedly enforcing state law.28 Section 1983’s lack of an 
exhaustion requirement is a major procedural difference between it 
and habeas.29 In the landmark case of Monroe v. Pape, Justice 
Douglas found that the “general language” of § 1983 makes the 
federal remedy “supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter 
need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is 
invoked.”30 In all, the Court has construed § 1983 to have a very 
“broad reach.”31 
Habeas and § 1983 are substantively different as well.32 For 
example, while habeas can result in a prisoner’s release from 
confinement,33 § 1983 provides an action for declaratory, injunctive, 
and monetary relief.34 Indeed, release from custody “lies at the heart 
 
jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights . . . shall . . . be liable to the 
party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”). 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) gives federal district courts 
jurisdiction to hear cases arising under § 1983. 
 27. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monroe held that a municipality was not 
a “person” as required by § 1983, meaning that a claim could not be raised directly against the 
city. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191–92. Monell reversed this conclusion, holding that “local 
governments, like every other § 1983 ‘person’ . . . may be sued for constitutional 
deprivations.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. 
 28. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 175–76. Justice Douglas found “three main aims” of the Ku 
Klux Klan Act. Id. at 173. First, it was possible that in certain circumstances the Act would 
override state law. Id. Second, “it provided a remedy where state law was inadequate,” to do 
so. Id. Third, the Act was “to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, “though 
adequate in theory, was not available in practice.” Id. at 174. 
 29. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501 (1982) (holding that “exhaustion is 
not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983”); Schwartz, supra note 23, at 98 (noting that the 
conflict between § 1983 and habeas arises because under habeas a prisoner must exhaust all 
state remedies before bringing suit, but under § 1983 she does not). 
 30. 365 U.S. at 183. 
 31. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 503 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring); Preiser v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973) (stating that the language of § 1983 is “broad” and 
that “[t]he statute is a general one”). Although § 1983 does not create substantive rights itself, 
it “provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” City of Okla. City v. 
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985) (plurality opinion). 
 32. See YACKLE, supra note 20, at 682 (comparing § 1983 and habeas, saying that “[i]n 
both instances, litigants can initiate original proceedings in federal court, contending that state 
officials have violated their federal rights”); Schwartz, supra note 23, at 88–89 (explaining that 
the major purpose of § 1983 was to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 33. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 34. Schwartz, supra note 23, at 89. Professor Yackle states that “[o]rdinarily, § 1983 
DO NOT DELETE 3/10/2014 11:31 AM 
185 The Heck Conundrum 
 191 
of the habeas corpus remedy,” but it is not available in a civil rights 
action.35 Also, damages are an important remedy under § 1983, but 
they are not available under habeas.36 
Despite the various differences between habeas and § 1983, state 
exhaustion is really the crux of the issue. Section 1983’s lack of a 
state exhaustion requirement lends itself to strategic litigation by 
prisoners because exhausting all state remedies under habeas is 
laborious, time consuming, and expensive. A state prisoner desiring 
to show that a state official violated her federal rights in a way that 
justifies the prisoner’s release generally has to jump through the 
various procedural hoops established by § 2254 of the habeas 
statute.37 But, if that same prisoner were able to side-step the 
burdensome habeas standard by using the more general § 1983 
statute, she could collaterally attack her conviction or confinement 
without exhausting state remedies. However, this side-step strategy 
conflicts with the purpose of habeas’s state exhaustion 
requirement—to preserve comity by defusing friction between state 
and federal courts. It would allow a prisoner to do what habeas 
expressly prohibits by merely changing the label on the complaint.38 
To avoid this, the Supreme Court has held that a state prisoner 
cannot attack the validity of her confinement or the duration thereof 
by means of a § 1983 civil action.39 In Preiser v. Rodriguez, plaintiff-
prisoners were denied “good-conduct-time credits” as a result of 
disciplinary proceedings.40 They sought the restoration of these 
 
actions offer nothing that habeas corpus does not also deliver, and usually a good deal less.” 
YACKLE, supra note 20, at 683. 
 35. Schwartz, supra note 23, at 104–05. 
 36. Id. See also YACKLE, supra note 20, at 684 (offering that “[a]ctions pursuant to § 
1983 may offer plaintiffs a form of relief that is not available in habeas proceedings—namely, 
compensatory damages”). 
 37. A prisoner must show that he has exhausted state remedies or that there is not an 
adequate remedy available in the state courts, or that special circumstances exist that make the 
state process ineffective to protect the prisoner’s rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)–(b) (2006). 
 38. MICHAEL L. WELLS ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS 925 (2d 
ed. 2011) (identifying this possibility). See also YACKLE, supra note 20, at 683 (calling it 
“inconsistent” to allow § 1983 actions where “habeas corpus is the traditional device for 
contesting unlawful deprivations of liberty” and stating that the mechanisms included therein 
are meant to ensure that habeas claims are brought “in a proper way at the proper time”). 
 39. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 
U.S. 539 (1974). 
 40. 411 U.S. at 476. 
DO NOT DELETE 3/10/2014 11:31 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
192 
credits through § 1983.41 The Court held that the § 1983 claim 
could not be considered because success in the civil action would 
attack the legality of the prisoners’ confinement and restoration of 
the credits would demand their immediate release from custody.42 
Since this result would fall squarely within the “traditional scope” of 
habeas corpus relief, using § 1983 to seek speedier release from 
prison is prohibited.43 However, where § 1983 claims do not trespass 
into traditional habeas territory, they usually are entertained. Indeed, 
the Court later allowed § 1983 claims to challenge rules and 
practices within state prisons so long as the validity or length of the 
plaintiff’s confinement was not jeopardized.44 
III. HECK AND ITS PROGENY 
After Preiser and subsequent cases, it was clear that a prisoner 
was prohibited from bringing a § 1983 claim that, if recognized, 
would also require shortening her term of confinement or her 
outright release. But, that same prisoner would still be allowed to 
bring a § 1983 injunctive action against the practices or procedures 
of a prison that violated her constitutional rights. The latter action 
may proceed because successfully proving the use of unconstitutional 
procedures within a prison would not necessarily require speedier 
release. Suppose, however, a prisoner did not seek release for an 
alleged unconstitutional confinement based on past violations, but 
instead sought only damages. Should the prisoner be able to bring a 
§ 1983 claim if doing so would jeopardize the validity of her 
confinement? In Heck v. Humphrey, the Court said “no” and the 
Heck bar was born. 
A. Heck v. Humphrey 
Roy Heck was convicted and sentenced in Indiana after a state 
court found him guilty of killing his wife.45 Heck appealed his 
sentence in the state court and also brought a pro se suit in federal 
 
 41. Id. at 477. 
 42. Id. at 498–99. 
 43. Id. at 487. 
 44. In Wolff v. McDonnell, the Court held that a § 1983 claim was permissible if a state 
prisoner merely desired to challenge the practices, rules, and regulations of the complex in 
which he was held, since it did not actually shorten his term. 418 U.S. at 543, 579. 
 45. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 478 (1994). 
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district court alleging that law enforcement officers violated his 
constitutional rights by knowingly destroying evidence.46 Heck 
sought compensatory and punitive money damages, but he did not 
seek injunctive relief or release from prison.47 
Heck was unsuccessful in the district court, which dismissed his 
§ 1983 claim without prejudice because it directly implicated the 
validity of his state conviction.48 He appealed this decision to the 
Seventh Circuit and while that appeal was pending, the Indiana 
Supreme Court affirmed Heck’s conviction.49 Following the 
affirmation, Heck submitted a writ of habeas corpus in federal court 
that was denied.50 Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of Heck’s § 1983 petition because even though he did not 
directly challenge the validity of his sentence, success on the § 1983 
claim would obligate the State to release him based on a violation 
related to his confinement.51 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit in an opinion 
without dissent. However, the Court split over how rigidly to apply 
its newly developed bar to § 1983 claims. While Justice Scalia wrote 
for the majority, his approach strictly requires the petitioner to prove 
that her state conviction was terminated in her favor before a federal 
court may entertain the civil claim that rests on the same set of 
facts.52 Concurring, Justice Souter championed a nuanced approach 
that emphasized simply avoiding collisions between habeas relief and 
§ 1983.53 Three other Justices joined Justice Souter,54 essentially 
making the uncontested Heck result a 5–4 decision on the rationale. 
1. Justice Scalia and the Court’s opinion 
Justice Scalia stated that the question before the Court involved 
 
 46. Id. at 479. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. Heck initially submitted a writ of habeas corpus prior to the affirmation of his 
state conviction that was denied because “it contained unexhausted claims.” Id. Nevertheless, 
Heck’s second federal habeas petition was also denied. Id. 
 51. Id. at 479–80. 
 52. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 53. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 54. Justice Souter was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor. Heck, 512 
U.S. at 491 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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“the intersection” of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254.55 
When previously considering the nature of this intersection, the 
Court discussed the “overlap” of § 1983 and § 2254.56 The Preiser 
court had noted in dicta that a state prisoner could seek damages via 
§ 1983 because habeas does not provide that remedy; thus, the 
action would not skirt too closely to habeas’s traditional scope.57 
Justice Scalia argued, however, that this “statement may not be 
true . . . when establishing the basis for the damages claim necessarily 
demonstrates the invalidity of the conviction.”58 Narrowly defined, 
the issue for the Court in Heck was whether a federal court should or 
should not recognize a § 1983 claim for damages that questions the 
validity of a state prisoner’s conviction or confinement.59 Finding 
that the Court treats § 1983 as a “species of tort liability,”60 Justice 
Scalia analogized § 1983 to the common law tort action of 
malicious prosecution.61 
Malicious prosecution is often brought when the plaintiff has 
been the subject of unjustified litigation that caused her some sort of 
harm.62 A malicious prosecution plaintiff must prove that the action 
against her led to a legal termination in her favor.63 The Court 
incorporated the favorable termination requirement to ensure that a 
federal court would not entertain a § 1983 action without the 
 
 55. Id. at 480 (majority opinion). 
 56. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 503–04 (1973). 
 57. Id. at 494. 
 58. Heck, 512 U.S. at 481–82. 
 59. Id. at 483. 
 60. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305–06 (1986) (quoting 
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978)) (recognizing a line of cases stating that the Court 
has “repeatedly noted that . . . § 1983 creates ‘a species of tort liability’ in favor of persons who 
are deprived of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured’ to them by the Constitution”); see 
also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976). 
Professor Yackle explained that by referring to tort law in these situations, “the Court may only 
mean to recognize that a defendant’s behavior often constitutes both a violation of the 
plaintiff’s federal rights for purpose of § 1983 and a common law wrong, compensable under 
state law.” YACKLE, supra note 20, at 472. Basically, categorizing § 1983 as a species of tort 
law gives the Court a starting point for analysis since the statute itself is written quite broadly 
and without much direction for detailed application. 
 61. Heck, 512 U.S. at 483–84. 
 62. STUART M. SPIESER, CHARLES F. KRAUSE & ALFRED W. GANS, THE AMERICAN 
LAW OF TORTS § 28.1 (Monique C. M. Leahy ed., 2011). This point is emphasized: “[w]ith 
respect to malicious-prosecution claims arising from both prior criminal and civil proceedings, 
the key is misuse of legal procedure—unjustifiable litigation.” Id. 
 63. Id. 
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petitioner first proving that the conviction with which her claim 
coincided was reversed, thus avoiding a collision at the intersection 
of habeas relief and § 1983. 
The Court reasoned that requiring the prisoner to show 
favorable termination of her conviction before initiating § 1983 
proceedings avoids parallel litigation over issues that might 
undermine the criminal conviction and result in two conflicting 
outcomes. In essence, a favorable termination requirement prohibits 
a collateral attack on the prisoner’s conviction via a § 1983 civil 
suit.64 Based on this understanding, the Court directed: 
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the . . . court 
must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, 
the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate 
that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.65 
Conversely, if the success of the plaintiff’s § 1983 action would 
not “demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal 
judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to 
proceed . . . .”66 And while favorable termination may appear to be a 
habeas-type exhaustion requirement, the Court maintained the 
procedural difference between habeas and the Heck bar by viewing 
Heck as the denial of an action’s existence.67 
In Mr. Heck’s case, the Court concluded that it could not 
entertain his § 1983 claim because the action for damages would 
functionally challenge the legality of his conviction. That is, his 
successful civil claim would prove that his conviction violated his 
constitutional rights, undermining the state supreme court’s 
affirmance of his conviction.68 
 
 64. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. The Court reasoned that “civil tort actions are not 
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Id. at 
485. For that reason, “§ 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove 
the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement” should be subject to the favorable 
termination requirement. Id. at 486. 
 65. Id. at 487 (emphasis added). In a footnote, the Court clarified that when a plaintiff 
does not seek damages directly attributable to conviction or confinement, but “whose 
successful prosecution would necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s criminal conviction was 
wrongful,” if the plaintiff would “have to negate an element of the offense of which he has 
been convicted,” the § 1983 claim cannot be brought. Id. at 486 n.6. 
 66. Id. at 487. 
 67. Id. at 489. 
 68. Id. at 490. 
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2. Justice Souter’s concurrence 
Justice Souter, and the three Justices joining him, also believed 
that Heck involved the intersection of § 1983 and habeas relief.69 He 
wrote separately because he agreed that the malicious prosecution 
analogy was a way to avoid collisions at the intersection, but he 
disagreed that the Court should create a bright-line rule.70 First, if 
the malicious prosecution analogy should properly guide the analysis, 
then, according to Justice Souter, a plaintiff should logically also be 
required to prove its other two elements: the lack of probable cause 
and intentional malice.71 However, the majority did not include 
these requirements because it would lead to absurd results. For 
example, imagine if a § 1983 petitioner whose conviction was 
overturned because police beat her during interrogation was 
expected to show a lack of probable cause before a federal court 
would hear her claim. It would be ridiculous to preclude the action 
from federal court because the officers, despite their unlawful 
interrogation methods, likely had probable cause to believe the 
plaintiff was guilty.72 
Thus, Justice Souter’s point is that the malicious prosecution 
analogy, from which derived the favorable termination requirement 
for § 1983 actions, should be the starting point only, rather than the 
final concrete rule. Since the majority did not adopt the other 
elements of malicious prosecution, rigid application of favorable 
termination seems inconsistent. Indeed, Justice Souter believed that 
the malicious prosecution analogy was a “simple way to avoid 
 
 69. Id. at 491 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. at 492 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Beermann, supra note 13, at 725–26 
(arguing that Heck’s analysis is inconsistent with prior law for several reasons, one being its 
broad requirement of common law elements for a § 1983 claim, and another being that 
“Justice Scalia’s opinion is quite extreme on the relationship between § 1983 and analogous 
common law”). 
 71. Heck, 512 U.S. at 493–94 (Souter, J., concurring); see SPIESER, KRAUSE & GANS, 
supra note 62, § 28.4, at 524–35 (explaining the elements of malicious prosecution in both 
civil and criminal proceedings). 
 72. Heck, 512 U.S. at 494 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Beermann, supra note 13, at 
726 (explaining that under malicious prosecution, once a conviction has occurred, the 
plaintiff’s common law action is “forever barred, even if subsequently, the conviction was held 
invalid.” Thus, a petitioner could have an action under color of law that deprived her of a 
constitutional right, as required by § 1983, but based on the Heck majority’s reasoning, this 
petitioner would not have a § 1983 claim because under “the most analogous common law” 
claim—malicious prosecution—the plaintiff’s action would not be available). 
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collisions at the intersection of habeas and § 1983,” but that it should 
not completely dictate the elements of a § 1983 cause of action.73 He 
warned that reading favorable termination as the basis for a § 1983 
analysis rather than just a starting point would “needlessly place at 
risk the rights of those outside the intersection of § 1983 and the 
habeas statute, [such as] individuals not ‘in custody’ for habeas 
purposes.”74 If individuals not within this intersection were required 
to show favorable termination, “the result would be to deny any 
federal forum for claiming a deprivation of federal rights.”75 These 
petitioners would not qualify under habeas since they are either not 
convicted or not currently confined. They would also be kept from § 
1983 relief since they cannot show a favorable state ruling. 
Therefore, no procedural vehicle would exist for these types of 
plaintiffs to bring their claims to a federal court. 
Inflexibly requiring favorable termination in all § 1983 cases in 
which there has been a prior conviction would leave viable federal 
claims unlitigated regardless of whether the intersection between 
habeas relief and § 1983 currently exists. Based solely on the 
reasoning in Heck, it is difficult to justify barring a petitioner not in 
custody from seeking § 1983 relief merely because she cannot 
demonstrate favorable termination, especially if she was never 
convicted in relation to the set of facts giving rise to the civil action 
in the first place. 
 
 73. Heck, 512 U.S. at 498 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 74. Id. at 500. The concurrence articulately presents the policy behind the careful 
navigation between the habeas statute and § 1983. Citing Preiser, Justice Souter explains that 
§ 1983 should be read in light of § 2254 “which applies only ‘to persons in custody’” because 
“state courts [should] be given the first opportunity to review constitutional claims bearing 
upon a state prisoner’s release from custody.” Id. at 497 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). Summarily, if a § 1983 claim were brought before a plaintiff secured a 
favorable termination, then the habeas statute would lose some of its vigor since state courts 
could be avoided by bringing the federal civil action, assuming that success in that civil action 
would necessarily undermine the criminal conviction in state court. Id. at 498. Justice Souter 
expounds by stating that to “allow[] a state prisoner to proceed directly with a federal-court § 
1983 attack on his conviction or sentence ‘would wholly frustrate explicit congressional intent’ 
as declared in the habeas exhaustion requirement.” Id. at 498 (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 
489). He further clarified that Congress decided that that “the appropriate remedy for state 
prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement” is through petitions 
of habeas corpus. Id. (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 490). 
 75. Id. at 500. 
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B. What Followed 
The Heck court established what it thought was a bright-line 
rule—a plaintiff seeking § 1983 relief must first show favorable 
termination of her conviction if success in the civil action would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction. If this rule applied 
only to current prisoners who are within the habeas relief and § 1983 
intersection, then it would be an appropriate means for avoiding 
jurisdictional collisions. However, Justice Souter feared that Heck 
would be interpreted so that § 1983 petitioners not in custody 
would also be held to the favorable termination requirement. His 
concurrence argued against this presumption, and it gained 
momentum four years later in Spencer v. Kemna when the Court 
considered whether a plaintiff’s habeas petition was moot since he 
was no longer in custody.76 
The Spencer plaintiff argued that if Heck barred him from 
bringing a § 1983 claim in relation to his first parole revocation 
unless he could show its invalidity, he would be kept out of federal 
court both by the mootness of his habeas petition and by Heck.77 
Essentially, if the Court found that Heck applied, the plaintiff would 
have no procedural mechanism to enter his claim in federal court. 
The Court concluded that the habeas petition was moot, but it is the 
Court’s commentary on § 1983 actions that is important here. 
Justice Scalia, again speaking for the majority, stated that it is not 
required that a § 1983 action for damages always be available.78 So, 
if it were true that Heck barred the plaintiff’s federal civil action, then 
that alone would not warrant his habeas petition remaining ripe.79 
However, the Court did not answer whether a § 1983 action 
brought by a petitioner no longer in custody could be maintained in 
federal court. 
Again concurring, Justice Souter argued that the “general” § 
1983 statute should be read in light of the “specific” habeas statute, 
which applies only to persons “in custody.”80 He believed it 
“important to read the Court’s Heck opinion as subjecting only 
 
 76. 523 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1998). 
 77. Id. at 17. 
 78. Id. Justice Scalia does not offer any additional rationale for this conclusion besides 
simply calling the petitioner’s Heck-mootness argument a “great non sequitur.” Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 20 (Souter, J., concurrence). 
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inmates seeking § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or 
confinement” to the favorable termination requirement “lest the 
plain breadth of § 1983 be unjustifiably limited at the expense of 
persons not ‘in custody.’”81 
Justice Souter reiterated his fear that if a plaintiff who did not fall 
under the habeas statute (not being in custody) were barred from 
bringing a § 1983 claim, it would create a “patent anomaly,”82 
keeping out petitioners with viable § 1983 claims despite no remedy 
under habeas. Justice Ginsburg, who had joined Justice Scalia in 
Heck, wrote her own concurrence in Spencer to state that she agreed 
with Justice Souter’s reasoning that “individuals without recourse to 
the habeas statute because they are not ‘in custody’ . . . fit within § 
1983’s ‘broad reach.’”83 Thus, by the end of Spencer, Justice 
Souter’s approach to § 1983 petitioners not in custody was arguably 
adopted by five of the Supreme Court Justices.84 
IV. THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ APPLICATION OF HECK TO PLAINTIFFS 
NOT IN CUSTODY 
Justice Souter’s persuasive arguments left unresolved the 
question whether Heck applies to plaintiffs not in custody, which 
eventually created a split between the circuits. The Second, Fourth, 
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that 
when a petitioner is not incarcerated, Heck does not bar a § 1983 
claim because the intersection of habeas relief and § 1983 is not 
present.85 Conversely, the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
 
 81. Id. (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 21 (Ginsburg, J., concurrence). Justice Ginsburg, agreeing with Justice 
Souter’s reasoning, indicated that at the end of Spencer, a majority of the Court held the view 
that a petitioner not in custody bringing a § 1983 claim was not Heck barred from doing so. 
Id. Half the federal circuits have applied the Spencer concurrence in these types of situations. 
See infra Part IV. 
 84. Justice Ginsburg, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Breyer all joined Justice Souter’s 
concurrence by agreeing that a petitioner not in custody is not Heck barred from bringing a § 
1983 claim. 523 U.S. at 18 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Stevens’ dissent puts him at odds 
with Justice Scalia’s opinion and defaults him into Justice Souter’s camp. Id. at 22 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that damage to reputation is sufficient collateral injury to preserve habeas 
from mootness). 
 85. See, e.g., Cohen v. Longshore, 621 F.3d 1311, 1316–17 (10th Cir. 2010) (agreeing 
with the Spencer concurrence approach that is more just and more in accordance with the 
purposes of § 1983 to not apply Heck to a petitioner who has no available habeas remedy); 
Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 267–68 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that a past prisoner does 
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Circuits have all concluded that the language in Heck makes it clear 
that where favorable termination cannot be shown, a petitioner is 
barred regardless of whether a habeas remedy is or ever was 
available.86 The Supreme Court has even acknowledged that the 
circuits hold contrasting views regarding Heck’s application to § 
1983 petitioners not in custody,87 though it chose not to 
provide guidance.88 
The Second Circuit directly addressed this issue by holding that a 
plaintiff “escape[s] the jaws of Heck” when she is not in the custody 
 
not “fall squarely” within Heck and choosing to employ the Spencer concurrences so plaintiff 
would not be left without access to federal court); Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1298 
(11th Cir. 2003) (adopting the view from Spencer that when federal habeas corpus is not 
available to address constitutional wrongs, § 1983 must be available); Nonnette v. Small, 316 
F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2002) (joining the circuits that find a § 1983 claim maintainable 
where petitioner has no habeas remedy); Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65, 74–75 (2d Cir. 
2001) (holding that even though a mother’s § 1983 action challenged the duration of 
confinement, it didn’t challenge the validity thereof, and finding Spencer to hold that § 1983 
must be available to address constitutional wrongs where habeas isn’t available); Carr v. 
O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1999) (indicating that Spencer dictum implies that 
Heck should not be a bar to prisoners who can no longer bring habeas petitions since released); 
Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff had “escaped 
the jaws of Heck” because he was not ever in the custody of the state); cf. Guerrero v. Gates, 
442 F.3d 697, 704–05 (9th Cir. 2006) (identifying an important limit on Nonnette, namely 
that the prisoner must “timely pursu[e]” the habeas claim while it is available for Heck not to 
apply after release). 
 86. See, e.g., Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that 
absent a decision from the Supreme Court, a convicted criminal no longer incarcerated is 
barred by Heck despite the concurrences in Spencer); Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 
177–78 (3d Cir. 2006) (criticizing the Second Circuit’s Huang opinion for adopting a rule 
not a part of a “cohesive majority opinion”); Giles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 209–10 (3d Cir. 
2005); Randall v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a plaintiff that is 
no longer in custody and thus cannot file a habeas petition is still barred by Heck); White v. 
Gittens, 121 F.3d 803, 806 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding Heck to say that even those who are no 
longer incarcerated and therefore do not have access to habeas corpus are still barred from 
bringing suit); Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that “Heck 
applies as much to prisoners in custody (a habeas prerequisite) as to persons no longer 
incarcerated”); cf. Powers v. Hamilton, 501 F.3d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that 
Justice Souter’s concurrences in Heck and Spencer did not intend to carve out a large exception 
for all former prisoners, but only for those who were precluded from bringing a habeas petition 
as a matter of law rather than simply failing to do so). 
 87. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 752 n.2 (2004). 
 88. Possibly, the Court has not yet responded to the split because requiring favorable 
termination as a prerequisite to a § 1983 claim makes little sense if the petitioner does not find 
herself within the habeas/§ 1983 intersection, which might require a bit of backpedaling after 
Heck and Spencer. See Note, supra note 13, at 880 (“A careful analysis of the underpinnings of 
Heck reveals that the legal merits of the favorable termination requirement are considerably 
weaker when applied to individuals who lack a potential habeas cause of action.”). 
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of the State, and since she has “no remedy in habeas corpus” she is 
allowed to pursue a § 1983 claim in federal court.89 The Sixth 
Circuit was equally forceful in determining that “Heck applies as 
much to prisoners in custody (a habeas prerequisite) as to persons no 
longer incarcerated.”90 This split implies that half of the circuits 
would allow a § 1983 action by a petitioner who is not in custody or 
has never been convicted in relation to the set of facts giving rise to 
the civil claim, even if another party’s conviction is based on those 
same facts. Since the petitioner herself is not standing in the 
intersection of habeas relief and § 1983, the Spencer concurrences 
indicate that her action may proceed. 
The Ninth Circuit provides a useful case study regarding the 
application of Heck to § 1983 plaintiffs who have no access to relief 
via habeas. It holds that in circumstances where a habeas remedy is 
unavailable, “a § 1983 claim may be maintained.”91 The same year 
that the Ninth Circuit made this rule, it decided Cunningham v. 
Gates,92 where the court faced the question whether Heck precluded 
a nonconvicted petitioner from bringing a § 1983 claim on facts that 
provided the basis for another’s conviction. Cunningham represents 
the awkwardness of fitting a non-Heck-typical plaintiff into a 
Heck analysis. 
There, co-felons Soly and Cunningham were surrounded by law 
enforcement officers after police received a tip and observed the two 
robbing a liquor store.93 Before they could leave in the getaway car, 
the police encircled them by “jamming” their escape.94 The officers 
fired into the car with shotguns and handguns, which culminated in 
Soly’s death and Cunningham’s permanent paralysis.95 
Cunningham was charged with Soly’s murder by provoking the 
officers to shoot at the getaway car, as well as robbery, burglary, and 
 
 89. Leather, 180 F.3d at 424. See also Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999). 
The Leather court notes that collateral estoppel may still bar the plaintiff’s claim even though 
Heck does not. Leather, 180 F.3d at 424. 
 90. Schilling, 58 F.3d at 1086. 
 91. Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the Ninth Circuit 
also requires that the plaintiff have “timely pursu[ed]” her habeas petition while available if 
Heck is not to bar her civil action once she is no longer confined. Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 
697, 704–05 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 92. 312 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 93. Id. at 1151–52. 
 94. Id. at 1152. 
 95. Id. 
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attempted murder of police officers.96 The jury was instructed that 
“it must find that Cunningham knew or should have known that he 
was shooting at police officers engaged in the performance of their 
duties.”97 He was convicted on all counts. Subsequently, Soly’s 
parents and Cunningham himself brought § 1983 claims against law 
enforcement for its brutal response to the robbery. The Ninth 
Circuit conclusively found that Heck barred Cunningham’s action 
because if he were successful, it would necessarily imply the invalidity 
of his conviction.98 
In regards to Soly’s parents, the court turned away from Heck 
and instead employed collateral estoppel principles.99 It quickly 
determined that the first two prongs of collateral estoppel had been 
met.100 First, the issues necessarily decided in Cunningham’s criminal 
trial were identical to the issues in the Solys’ § 1983 claim, and 
second, Cunningham’s trial resulted in a judgment on the merits. 
The third prong requires that the party raising the issue be in privity 
with the party against whom it has already been adjudicated. So, the 
court evaluated whether the Solys “had an identity or community of 
interest” with Cunningham and whether he was their “virtual 
representative.”101 Specifically identifying three important reasons 
privity was lacking, the court held that: (1) the Solys were not 
represented by counsel at the criminal trial, (2) they had no voice in 
the proceedings, and (3) the jury did not have the benefit of the 
evidence or argument from Soly’s view.102 The court also stated that 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1155. 
 99. The California common law elements of collateral estoppel that the Cunningham 
court applied are that (1) the issues in both actions are identical, (2) the issue was fully 
adjudicated in the prior action, and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is applied 
was a party to the previous action or in privity with a party to that action. Id. The court did not 
give any real explanation why Heck was inapplicable. However, since neither the Solys nor their 
son were convicted, it would have been impossible to find them within the intersection of 
habeas and § 1983. 
 100. Collateral estoppel generally requires that the issues be identical, that the issue was 
fully adjudicated in the first case, that the party against whom collateral estoppel applied was a 
party or in privity with a party to the first case, and that the party against whom collateral 
estoppel is applied had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. See infra Part VI.B. 
 101. Cunningham, 312 F.3d at 1156 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 
7 F.3d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1993) and United States v. Geophysical Corp., 732 F.2d 693, 697 
(9th Cir. 1984)). 
 102. Id. 
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Cunningham’s and Soly’s interests probably would have “sharply 
diverged” at trial.103 Additionally, the court reasoned that it would 
require “[l]ooking into a crystal ball” to divine exactly how Soly’s 
own trial would have come out and that such “rank speculation” is 
insufficient to invoke collateral estoppel.104 Thus, to reach its 
conclusion that Soly’s parents’ § 1983 action could proceed, the 
court looked outside the Heck framework and opted to use a 
collateral estoppel analysis instead. Unfortunately, the court did not 
expressly state that Heck did not apply.  
Three years later, the Ninth Circuit decided Smith v. City of 
Hemet, in which the court held that a man convicted of resisting 
arrest was not barred by Heck from bringing a § 1983 claim for 
excessive force.105 It reasoned that the civil action could proceed 
without undermining the conviction because excessive force might 
have been used subsequent to the conduct on which the conviction 
was based.106 The court explained that a § 1983 action is not Heck 
barred unless its successful prosecution would necessarily imply the 
invalidity of plaintiff’s earlier conviction.107 This set the stage 
for Beets. 
V. BEETS V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Currently, the majority of the circuits would not find Heck to bar 
a petitioner from bringing a § 1983 claim in relation to her 
conviction or confinement if she never was or no longer is in 
custody.108 However, if the § 1983 petitioner’s claim implies the 
invalidity of another party’s conviction, should the Heck bar apply? 
One might deduce from Nonnette v. Small,109 Cunningham v. 
Gates,110 and Smith v. City of Hemet111 that the Ninth Circuit’s Heck 
 
 103. Id. This is particularly true since Cunningham was convicted of causing Soly’s 
death. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. 394 F.3d 689, 707 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 106. Id. at 698. 
 107. Id. at 699. 
 108. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 109. 316 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that where habeas is not available for 
relief, § 1983 must be). 
 110. 312 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a petitioner not convicted on 
the set of facts giving rise to the § 1983 action was not barred by Heck nor collateral estoppel 
since the parties were not in privity). 
 111. 394 F.3d 689, 699 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a § 1983 claim is not barred by 
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jurisprudence allows a nonconvicted, nonconfined § 1983 petitioner 
to bring an action for damages, despite another’s conviction resting 
on the same set of facts. Heck appears not to apply because the 
petitioner herself does not have access to any sort of relief under 
habeas since she is not in custody. Further, if the Cunningham 
court’s reasoning is adopted, collateral estoppel likely will also not 
preclude the action because the high privity standard would not be 
met. Nevertheless, in Beets v. County of Los Angeles,112 the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that Heck prohibits this type of § 1983 action, 
thereby realizing the fear of five Justices from the Spencer court that 
Heck could be read to bar petitioners not in the habeas relief and 
§ 1983 intersection.113 
In May of 2008, Glenn Rose was shot and killed by police while 
he and Sarah Morales attempted to flee law enforcement in a stolen 
vehicle.114 Morales was charged and convicted based on an aiding 
and abetting theory for assaulting an officer with a deadly weapon 
while she knew or should have known the officer was engaged in the 
performance of his duties.115 Her conviction was affirmed by the 
state appellate court, and the state supreme court denied review.116 
Meanwhile, Rose’s parents filed a § 1983 claim in federal court 
in their own rights and as successors in interest to their son.117 The 
claim alleged that the officer used excessive deadly force against 
Rose, violating his and their constitutional rights.118 The court found 
that Heck barred the § 1983 claim by reasoning that the jury already 
found the officer’s performance lawful in relation to Rose because of 
the aiding and abetting theory.119 Thus, if the plaintiffs were 
successful in the § 1983 claim, the result would necessarily imply the 
invalidity of Morales’s conviction.120 
  
 
Heck unless it necessarily implies or demonstrates that the plaintiff’s conviction is invalid). 
 112. 699 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 113. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
 114. Beets, 699 F.3d at 1040. For a fuller recitation of the Beets facts, see Part I. 
 115. 669 F.3d at 1040. 
 116. Id. at 1040–41. 
 117. Id. at 1040. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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Besides Cunningham,121 the various circuit courts have not 
confronted many cases in which a nonconvicted successor-in-interest 
plaintiff seeks § 1983 damages based on the same set of facts for 
which the deceased party’s co-felon was convicted.122 Ultimately, 
such a situation requires the court to reference the co-felon’s 
conviction and find one of two possibilities. The first is that success 
in the plaintiff’s action necessarily implies the invalidity of the 
confined party’s conviction. The alternative possibility is that the 
parties are in privity so that collateral estoppel bars the § 1983 
action. The first possibility would be an application of the Heck bar, 
the second, plain collateral estoppel. However in Beets, the Ninth 
Circuit misconstrued Heck by fusing these two doctrines together. 
The Beets court’s analysis established that the jury found Morales 
to have acted willfully against a police officer who was not using 
excessive force to lawfully perform his duties.123 The court reasoned 
that a jury’s verdict determines the lawfulness of the officer’s action 
“throughout the whole course of the defendant’s conduct.”124 The 
court felt that if the Beets plaintiffs were successful in the § 1983 
action, it would necessarily imply that the jury in Morales’s trial got 
it wrong.125 
The court found that “‘if a criminal conviction arising out of the 
same facts stands and is fundamentally inconsistent with the unlawful 
behavior for which section 1983 damages are sought, the 1983 
 
 121. 312 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 122. In Figueroa v. Rivera, 147 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 1998), the First Circuit heard a case in 
which the family of a prisoner who died while his habeas petition was being reviewed brought 
a § 1983 action against the State for malicious prosecution. The prisoner’s alleged co-felon, 
who was in custody as well, also filed for habeas, but the reviewing judge denied both 
petitions. The court held that Heck barred the family from bringing the claim because the 
deceased prisoner did not show that his conviction had been overturned. The court was 
skeptical that a § 1983 plaintiff might satisfy Heck by referencing the surviving co-felon’s 
potential conviction reversal. Id. at 81. 
 123. Beets, 669 F.3d at 1047. 
 124. Id. 
 125. The court points out that if Rose rather than Morales had been convicted, this civil 
action would have to be dismissed pursuant to Heck. Also, Morales’s conviction bars her from 
bringing a § 1983 action based on the officer’s actions. Id. The author of this Comment 
completely agrees that if Rose were alive and in state prison claiming a § 1983 violation, there 
is no doubt that Heck would preclude him. Similarly, if it were Morales bringing the § 1983 
claim, she would most definitely run afoul of the Heck bar since she would be unable to meet 
the favorable termination requirement. As it is, neither of these scenarios is actually the case 
and the action should be allowed. 
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action must be dismissed.’”126 It quickly pointed out that this rule 
references a “criminal conviction” rather than the “plaintiff’s” 
conviction and that this choice of language suggests that Heck “may 
apply to civil actions brought by individuals other than the convicted 
criminal if such application does not otherwise violate any 
constitutional principles.”127 
In the name of Heck, the court forged ahead to apply the 
collateral estoppel analysis used by the Cunningham court, without 
making any distinction between the two doctrines. It found that the 
first two prongs of collateral estoppel were met during Morales’s 
criminal jury trial because the trial resulted in a judgment on the 
merits of whether the officer acted within the scope of his duty 
during the attempted arrest.128 In reference to whether that 
judgment applied to the Beets plaintiffs, the court explained that the 
plaintiffs were not parties to Morales’s criminal prosecution, so Heck 
preclusion could apply only if the plaintiffs “had an identity or 
community of interest” with Morales.129 The court concluded that 
the plaintiffs were in privity with Morales on the issue of excessive 
force and that they should have reasonably expected to be bound by 
the jury’s decision in Morales’s trial.130 
The court failed to explain how Rose could have argued for his 
own interests at Morales’s criminal trial since Rose could not join as 
an interested party like he might have in civil court, even if he were 
alive. Nevertheless, the court held: 
[W]here more than one person engages in a concerted criminal act 
during the course of which one of the criminals is killed by the 
police, then when the propriety of the officer’s action is critical to 
the conviction of a surviving criminal, and the deceased’s interests 
in the issue are in no way inconsistent with the surviving criminal’s 
interest in the issue, the “community of interest” is such that the 
deceased and those asserting claims through the deceased may  
 
 
 126. Id. at 1046 (quoting Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
This rule actually comes from Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1997), which 
was decided before Spencer and dealt with a petitioner who had pleaded to assault with a 
deadly weapon. This makes it quite distinguishable from Beets. 
 127. Beets, 669 F.3d at 1046. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1047 (quoting Cunningham v. Gates, 312 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 130. Id. at 1046–48. 
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reasonably be bound by the determination of the issue by a jury in 
the criminal proceeding.131 
The court believed that this perspective preserved two important 
judicial policies that the Supreme Court cited when it established the 
Heck bar: first, the policy against conflicting resolutions arising out of 
the same transactions and, second, a concern for finality and 
consistency.132 Yet, allowing a § 1983 petitioner to proceed with her 
action despite another’s conviction on the same set of facts would 
not violate finality or consistency. In fact, it would be harmonious 
with federal law and Court precedent regarding inconsistent 
convictions for co-felons.133 
VI. TROUBLING RESULTS 
In both Heck and Spencer, Justice Souter explained that he 
viewed § 1983 as a broad statute and habeas as a specific statute.134 If 
a diagram were used to depict this idea, one large circle 
encompassing all constitutional violations could be titled “Potential 
Constitutional Violations.” Within that large circle, a smaller one 
would appear titled “Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction.” All constitutional 
claims seeking or resulting in release from confinement would fall 
within the smaller circle. Anything outside the small circle could give 
rise to a § 1983 action, but any claim within that smaller circle 
would be off limits to a § 1983 claim. Thus, the broad § 1983 cause 
of action is curtailed only when an action falls within the scope of 
habeas relief. Where that is not the case, § 1983 should be allowed 
to function in its role as the vehicle for securing relief for 
constitutional violations.135 The overlapping of the two circles is 
what the Justices call the habeas relief and § 1983 intersection, and 
claims not within the intersection should be allowed to proceed. 
Thus, the petitioner could be cruising down § 1983 Street without 
ever getting caught in the intersection with Habeas Street. That 
 
 131. Id. at 1048. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See infra Part VI.A.1. 
 134. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 497, 502 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring); 
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 20 (1998) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 135. However, there are limits to the recovery that § 1983 can offer even in justifiable 
situations due to obstacles such as “state sovereign immunity, municipal immunity from 
respondeat superior liability, and qualified immunity for law enforcement officers.” Buford, 
supra note 13, at 1502–03. 
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crossing is where jurisdictional collisions occur and it must 
be avoided. 
 
To reiterate, Heck held that a prisoner seeking damages under 
§ 1983 would be prohibited from doing so if the action’s success 
would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of her conviction, unless she 
could first show that her conviction was favorably terminated.136 
Thus, the holding consists of two parts: (1) the necessary invalidity 
test and (2) the favorable termination test. A logical exercise will 
help highlight the problems with this requirement: A § 1983 
petitioner who has not been convicted of a crime in relation to a set 
of facts cannot necessarily imply the invalidity of her own conviction 
because there is none. The nonexistent conviction makes the second 
part of the Heck test moot since one cannot show the favorable 
termination of a conviction that never existed in the first place. 
Therefore, if a court is to find that Heck bars a § 1983 petitioner 
who has not been convicted, it must do so exclusively by referring to 
a party who has been convicted based on the same set of facts from 
which the § 1983 action arises. The following section argues that 
this Heck-by-reference approach is inconsistent with the reasoning 
upon which the Heck opinion was based, and this approach 
convolutes the important preclusion purpose for which Heck 
stands—to avoid undermining state criminal convictions by using a 
federal civil cause of action. 
 
 136. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. 
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A. Heck Should Not Bar a § 1983 Petitioner Who Is Not at the Habeas 
Intersection 
“Finality and consistency” in judicial proceedings was a major 
policy factor in the Court’s Heck ruling,137 but it was not the only 
policy consideration. Both Justices Scalia and Souter acknowledged 
that certiorari needed to be granted in Heck because it dealt with the 
important and often litigated “intersection” between § 1983 and 
§ 2254.138 Avoiding a collision between these two statutes was the 
driving force behind the Court’s holding and the implementation of 
the favorable termination requirement.139 In his concurrence, Justice 
Souter explained that he agreed with the majority that the favorable 
termination standard is “a relatively simple way to avoid collisions at 
the intersection of habeas and § 1983.”140 Thus, not only did the 
Court worry about finality and consistency, but it specifically sought 
to protect the traditional scope of habeas corpus relief by prohibiting 
any run-around attack resulting from a § 1983 action. In cases where 
a § 1983 petitioner does not find herself in this intersection, Heck 
should not apply. 
As noted, this is the stance taken by more than half of the federal 
circuits,141 and until the Supreme Court specifically addresses the 
issue, confusion will persist. Further, Justice Souter suggests that the 
“sensible way” to read Heck is that only a prisoner bringing a § 1983 
 
 137. See Buford, supra note 13, at 1513 (stating that one must appreciate that Heck 
advanced the principles of “consistency, finality, and federalism”); Schneidau, supra note 13, at 
652 (arguing that “[s]uccess in collaterally-attacking tort suits would allow two diametrically 
opposed judicial decisions concerning the same set of operative facts to stand,” jeopardizing 
the policies of finality and consistency). 
 138. Heck, 512 U.S. at 480; id. at 491 (Souter, J., concurring); see also id. at 490 
(Thomas, J., concurring). This intersection has also been referred to as an “overlap.” See supra 
note 56 and accompanying text. 
 139. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87 (Souter, J., concurring) (reasoning that allowing a “civil 
tort action[]” to “challenge[] the validity of outstanding criminal judgments . . . that 
necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement” is a 
“hoary principle” because it violates the traditional purpose of habeas). See also Note, supra 
note 13, at 881 (arguing that “there is less of a basis for extending the favorable termination 
requirement to cases in which the direct conflict between § 1983 and habeas corpus is 
impossible because habeas is unavailable”) (emphasis added). The Court wanted to prevent 
individuals seeking injunctive relief from bypassing the habeas exhaustion requirement, and the 
Court feared that the basis for the § 1983 suit might also be used as a basis for a claim for 
release from prison. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489 (majority opinion). 
 140. Heck, 512 U.S. at 498 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 141. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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claim must satisfy the favorable termination requirement; otherwise, 
Heck could be seen as “needlessly plac[ing] at risk the rights of those 
outside the intersection of § 1983 and the habeas statute, individuals 
not ‘in custody’ for habeas purposes.”142 Such an outcome is 
troubling because it might “deny any federal forum for claiming a 
deprivation of federal rights.”143 
This is precisely what happened in Beets. Since the plaintiff-
parents were in no way connected with the crime, they were not 
convicted or imprisoned. Thus, the § 1983 action could not 
necessarily imply the invalidity of their conviction.144 Rose was killed 
in the exchange resulting in Morales’s conviction, so his parents’ § 
1983 action would not necessarily imply the invalidity of Rose’s 
conviction.145 In order for the Heck bar to keep Rose’s parents out of 
federal court, the Beets court determined that Morales’s conviction 
threatened a collision at the habeas and § 1983 intersection because 
the jury concluded in her trial that the officer did not use excessive 
force.146 If the Beets plaintiffs were successful in their § 1983 claim, 
the court thought it would necessarily imply the invalidity of 
Morales’s conviction.147 However, this reasoning is problematic most 
prominently because it suggests that the prosecutorial outcome for 
co-felons is never inconsistent. 
1. Codefendants may receive different verdicts 
The potential that co-felons might receive inconsistent 
judgments is neither impossible nor taboo. The Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure state that when the joinder of defendants in a 
trial appears to prejudice a defendant, the court may sever the 
defendants’ trials such that they occur separately.148 There are 
numerous reasons codefendants might be tried separately: a 
codefendant’s admitted confession incriminates the other, one 
codefendant seeks to call the other as a defense witness, the 
codefendants offer conflicting defenses or strategies, a codefendant 
 
 142. Heck, 512 U.S. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See generally Beets v. Cnty. of L.A., 669 F.3d 1038, 1040–41 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 145. See generally id. 
 146. Beets, 669 F.3d at 1047–48. 
 147. Id. 
 148. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a). 
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fears being found guilty by association, or a codefendant desires to 
avoid evidence confusion at trial.149 For example, in United States v. 
Mayfield,150 the Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its 
discretion when it failed to grant the defendants’ motion for 
severance based on mutually exclusive defenses.151 Separate trials 
could result in conflicting verdicts, condemning one while 
exonerating the other. 
Despite the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure codify the severance rule to preserve a 
defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial. Similarly, § 1983 was 
passed so that a private right of action is available to individuals who 
can prove that state actors violated their constitutional rights.152 The 
underlying principle is the same—that is, finality and consistency, 
though important to the judicial system, should not trump civil 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Unilaterally denying a 
petitioner’s potentially successful § 1983 claim because it might 
imply the invalidity of another’s criminal conviction is not 
compatible with this principle. Indeed, it implies that a less serious § 
1983 claim would remain cognizable, while more serious 
constitutional claims, ones that actually have the power to imply the 
invalidity of another’s conviction, would not be remedied at all.153 
The possibility of codefendants receiving inconsistent verdicts 
supports the conclusion that a Beets-like scenario does not warrant a 
Heck bar. Heck applies when an attempted § 1983 claim would 
necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or confinement. 
Where co-felons are tried separately due to severance, inconsistent 
results do not necessarily imply the invalidity of one verdict or the 
other; it simply means that for whatever reason, the juries read the 
facts differently. Thus, a Beets-scenario petitioner should not be Heck 
barred because success in the § 1983 claim does not necessarily imply 
invalidity, just as severance leading to inconsistent verdicts for 
 
 149. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 17.2(a)–17.2(f) (3d 
ed. 2011). 
 150. 189 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 151. Id. at 899–900. However, in the defendant’s individual trial, a jury again found him 
guilty, which was affirmed on appeal. United States v. Mayfield, 418 F.3d 1017 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
 152. See supra Part II. 
 153. See Note, supra 13, at 889 (identifying this anomaly). 
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codefendants does not necessarily imply the invalidity of the 
conflicting verdicts. 
Justice O’Connor explained the importance of the adverb 
“necessarily” when a court decides whether a § 1983 plaintiff’s claim 
implies the invalidity of an outstanding conviction: 
[W]e were careful in Heck to stress the importance of the term 
“necessarily.” For instance, we acknowledged that an inmate could 
bring a challenge to the lawfulness of a search pursuant to § 1983 
in the first instance, even if the search revealed evidence used to 
convict the inmate at trial, because success on the merits would not 
“necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful.” To 
hold otherwise would have cut off potentially valid damages actions 
as to which a plaintiff might never obtain favorable termination—
suits that could otherwise have gone forward had the plaintiff not 
been convicted.154 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding inconsistent 
verdicts for a single defendant further supports the importance of 
“necessary” invalidity. Indeed, in federal courts, “it is not necessary 
that the verdict returned by a jury be logically consistent in all 
respects.”155 Dunn v. United States held that “[c]onsistency in the 
verdict is not necessary” since each count in an indictment is 
regarded separately.156 Subsequently, in United States v. Dotterweich, 
the Court found that an inconsistent verdict in relation to 
codefendants was not a basis for reversal because juries may indulge 
in motives or vagaries such as “carelessness or compromise,”157 
which may result in one defendant going free while the other is left 
with full responsibility of the crime. 
Thus, the possibility of inconsistency arising from a petitioner’s 
successful § 1983 claim and another’s conviction is not strong 
enough to keep the plaintiff out of federal court.158 There will be no 
 
 154. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004) (internal citations omitted). 
 155. LAFAVE, supra note 149, § 24.10(b). 
 156. 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932). The Court further explained that inconsistency may be 
the result of compromise or mistake, but that verdicts should not be set aside by speculation or 
inquiry into such matters. Id. at 394. 
 157. 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943). 
 158. See Note, supra note 13, at 886–88 (stating that continued litigation might 
compromise finality to a certain point, but it does not create the same state interest in denying 
relief as it does in the habeas context and that states’ interest in denying remedies under § 
1983 are “simply not so substantial as to deny access to [a] federal forum”). 
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pressure on the State to release or reduce the convicted party’s 
confinement on the basis that another party secured relief for a 
violation of constitutional rights arising from the same set of facts. 
The critical missing element is Justice O’Connor’s “necessarily.”159 
Not only are inconsistent verdicts against one defendant 
undisturbed, but inconsistent verdicts among codefendants are also 
presumed valid. Therefore, allowing a plaintiff to proceed with a § 
1983 claim will not undermine another’s conviction, even if they rest 
on the same set of facts. 
2. An aiding and abetting conviction does not determine the principal’s 
fate 
The importance of “necessarily” is particularly dispositive in the 
Beets case because Morales’s conviction relied on the theory that she 
aided and abetted Rose, which suggests that Rose himself was guilty 
of criminal activity. Aiding and abetting requires proof that one is 
present and means to assist the perpetrator of a crime.160 However, 
an aiding and abetting conviction does not depend on whether or 
not the case’s principal is convicted.161 Standefer v. United States 
holds that a jury could validly find Morales guilty, while Rose, as the 
principal, could be acquitted.162 This possibility further highlights the 
validity of inconsistent results between co-felons. Thus, reasoning 
that the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim should not proceed because success 
would necessarily imply the invalidity of Morales’s conviction is 
neither accurate nor persuasive. 
 
 159. Beets has already caused at least one district court to forget the importance of 
“necessarily.” In Allen v. United States, No. 03-01358-DAE-RJJ, 2012 WL 1424167, at *1 
n.1 (D. Nev. Apr. 24, 2012), the District Court of Nevada noted that Beets held that plaintiffs 
convicted of a crime may be barred from bringing a § 1983 action if success would “tend to 
undermine the plaintiff’s . . . conviction.” Tending to undermine and necessarily undermining 
are different standards. A § 1983 action could tend to undermine an existing conviction 
without necessarily undermining it. However, in Allen, this was not dispositive to the court’s 
conclusion, because the court found the plaintiff’s arrest to be “separated temporally and 
spatially from [his] criminal activity” and so Heck did not apply anyway. Id. 
 160. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 167 (2012). 
 161. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 13–14, 25 (1980). 
 162. Id. Standefer involved a defendant who was indicted for aiding and abetting a 
revenue official in accepting compensation in addition to that authorized by law. The Court 
upheld defendant’s nine-count conviction despite the revenue official’s acquittal in the same 
case. It stated that “[w]hile symmetry of results [in these situations] may be intellectually 
satisfying, it is not required.” Id. at 25. 
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B. Collateral Estoppel May Still Bar Certain § 1983 Claims 
Some may argue that the Beets court was justified in extending 
Heck because it broadens a tool useful in quickly disposing of § 1983 
cases in which a criminal conviction remains. However, even if Heck 
does not apply to § 1983 claims in which the petitioner’s action rests 
on the same set of facts that led to another’s conviction, collateral 
estoppel may still effectively preclude the claim. Conceptually 
applying the Heck bar to a petitioner not located at the habeas and § 
1983 intersection can be tricky, as the Ninth Circuit discovered in 
Cunningham.163 There is, after all, no clear precedent on how to do 
it. Thus, in both Cunningham and Beets, the Ninth Circuit created a 
hybrid analysis by combining Heck with collateral estoppel. This 
approach is not necessary. Where Heck does not properly fit the facts, 
collateral estoppel should be applied instead. 
The Ninth Circuit’s Heck jurisprudence exemplifies why this is 
so. The Cunningham court held that the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim was 
not barred under Heck or collateral estoppel because the deceased’s 
interests “sharply diverged” from those of his co-felon.164 Conversely, 
in Beets, the nonconvicted plaintiffs were found in privity and thus Heck 
barred.165 This type of Heck application is exactly what Justice Souter, 
and the majority of Justices by the end of Spencer,166 feared would 
 
 163. Cunningham v. Gates, 312 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2002) (using collateral estoppel 
principles rather than the Heck favorable termination test to analyze whether petitioners’ § 
1983 claim was barred). See supra notes 92–104 and accompanying text. 
 164. Cunningham, 312 F.3d at 1156. Although it could be argued that this wording 
leaves open the possibility that the court did not think that either Heck or privity applied after 
analyzing both, this would mean that the court did think that Heck could apply to the Solys, 
and it just did not find that Heck barred them from their claim in this specific instance. 
However, a more persuasive view of this wording is that the court did not think Heck applied 
and so it evaluated the claim under collateral estoppel; if the court initially thought that Heck 
did bar the Solys’ claim, then some mention or analysis of favorable termination would be 
present for future readers to consider. In its absence, this Comment’s author believes that the 
court did not intend to apply Heck to petitioners bringing a § 1983 action on behalf of a 
deceased party. 
 165. The Beets Court found the “necessary invalidity” test is required in any § 1983 
situation since City of Hemet used the wording “a criminal conviction” rather than “the 
plaintiff’s” criminal conviction when referring to petitioners falling within Heck’s scope. Beets 
v. Cnty. of L.A., 669 F.3d 1038, 1046 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 166. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O’Connor joined Justice Souter’s concurrence in 
Heck, and in Spencer, his concurrence was joined by Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and Ginsburg. 
Justice Ginsburg had originally been with Justice Scalia in the Heck majority, so after Spencer, it 
appears that the majority of the court agrees with the concerns outlined by Justice Souter. See 
also Buford, supra note 13, at 1509 (stating that Justice Souter’s refusal to apply the favorable 
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happen—a § 1983 plaintiff with no access to habeas relief was kept out 
of federal court because she was unable to show favorable termination 
of a conviction, not even her own. 
While this Heck and collateral estoppel fusion reaches results 
unintended by at least four of the Justices who made up the Heck 
court,167 collateral estoppel may preclude § 1983 claims by its own 
doctrinal elements. Collateral estoppel generally consists of four 
parts: (1) whether the issues in the first case are identical to the issues 
in the second, (2) whether the prior case resulted in a final judgment 
on the merits, (3) whether the party against whom collateral estoppel 
is raised was a party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication, and (4) whether the party against whom collateral 
estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue 
in the prior proceeding.168 
If a § 1983 petitioner is to be barred in a non-Heck scenario, 
meaning the petitioner is not a currently incarcerated prisoner, 
collateral estoppel is favorable to the Heck bar. As in Cunningham 
and Beets, the first two prongs of collateral estoppel are probably met 
even in another’s criminal trial. At least some of the issues are likely 
to be identical, such as whether a police officer acted within the 
scope of his duties,169 and the judge or jury will likely give a final 
judgment on the merits of those issues. It is more difficult to 
conclude that a § 1983 plaintiff not involved in another’s criminal 
trial whatsoever should reasonably expect to be bound by its 
conclusions.170 A nonconvicted plaintiff was likely not a party to 
another’s criminal trial nor could she have intervened.171 Indeed, in 
 
termination requirement to plaintiffs not incarcerated at the time of the civil action now 
commands the majority of the Court). 
 167. See supra notes 54, 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 168. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 489 (2012). The “full and fair opportunity to litigate” 
is sometimes inferred from the third element. Thus, it is not uncommon for some states to 
view collateral estoppel as a three-element analysis. 
 169. However, an argument can be made that even if the officer acted within the scope of 
her duties in relation to one party to a crime, she may have exceeded that scope by using 
excessive force in relation to another party. 
 170. “Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary 
to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different 
cause of action involving a party to the first case.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) 
(citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)). 
 171. The criminal system does not allow intervention like the civil system does. Cf. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 24. 
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order for collateral estoppel to be applicable to a nonconvicted § 
1983 petitioner, the court will have to find privity. 
Privity exists when a nonparty to a suit adequately has interests 
represented by someone with the same interests who is a party to the 
suit.172 Thus, if she is to be kept out of court, a § 1983 petitioner 
not convicted on a set of facts must be in privity with one who was 
convicted on those same facts. It is possible that the § 1983 petitioner 
is situated so that her rights are conditioned by a judgment involving 
another person,173 but a party also deserves a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate her § 1983 issue and another’s criminal trial in which the 
petitioner cannot intervene may not be an effective or appropriate 
forum. Moreover, based on the discussion of severance and the 
validity of inconsistent verdicts,174 privity in a criminal case is likely 
harder to find than in a civil case. Since co-felon defendants can 
employ differing theories of defense, it is difficult to precisely state 
that one’s criminal defense adequately represents the interests of the 
other. However, while privity may be difficult to find, it is not 
impossible,175 and engaging in a privity analysis in situations where a 
nonconvicted § 1983 plaintiff’s claim coincides with another’s 
conviction works to both protect the rights of § 1983 petitioner as 
well as preclude only those actions where the high privity standards 
are met. 
Therefore, where privity is appropriate, collateral estoppel may 
properly preclude a petitioner’s § 1983 action regardless of any 
reference to Heck. Although collateral estoppel and the Heck bar feel 
related, in cases where both are considered as bars to an action, 
courts evaluate them as separate and distinct doctrines.176 Thus, in a 
 
 172. Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 798–99 (1996) (quoting Martins v. 
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989)). 
 173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 4 Introductory Note (1982). 
 174. See supra Part VI.A.1. 
 175. Indeed, the Beets court may likely have reached the same conclusion regarding 
Rose’s parents by directly employing collateral estoppel and not referencing Heck as part of its 
analysis. For instance, Rose was the actual aggressor and instigator in Beets and any evidence 
presented at Morales’s trial would likely have applied equally to Rose himself. Accordingly, by 
assuming all else equal, it is plausible that the court could have found Rose’s interests 
adequately represented by Morales during her trial. 
 176. See, e.g., Levine v. Kling, 123 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that even if 
a plaintiff is able to get his conviction overturned and avoid Heck, collateral estoppel could 
still apply). 
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non-Heck scenario, courts would be wise to clearly indicate that 
collateral estoppel and not Heck is the applicable analysis.177 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Finality and consistency are important to the integrity of the 
judicial system; § 1983 claims that would jeopardize those principles 
are properly barred under Heck. However, in situations where a 
petitioner’s civil action does not necessarily imply the invalidity of 
another’s conviction, Heck should not be used to preclude the claim 
because it stretches Heck far beyond what it was intended to avoid—
collisions at the intersection of habeas corpus relief and § 1983. 
If there are instances in which an individual’s conviction would 
necessarily be implied invalid by another’s § 1983 action, the § 
1983 action could be prohibited by the common law principles of 
collateral estoppel. This was the Ninth Circuit’s approach in 
Cunningham and its attempt in Beets. But, if this is to be the 
approach, then courts should be clear that they are analyzing the 
two doctrines separately, rather than conflating them. This way, 
courts will preserve the integral purpose of the Heck bar without 
giving it a broader reach by thrusting additional and independent 
analytical components into the already polarizing Heck analysis.178 
A court should be able to look at a case like Beets and see no 
direct intersection between habeas relief and § 1983 nor any danger 
of implying the invalidity of the petitioner’s own conviction because 
she has not been convicted. Thus, it can proceed with a collateral 
estoppel and privity analysis without incorporating Heck. In that case, 
the court will need persuasive reasons to find privity between the 
would-be § 1983 petitioner and the convicted party. Absent privity, 
the petitioner should be allowed to litigate the potentially successful § 
1983 claim in a federal forum. Otherwise, if there is no remedy at the 
 
 177. See Schneidau, supra note 13, at 672 (arguing that collateral estoppel, like the 
favorable termination requirement from Heck, serves the “important state interest” of 
preserving resources, preventing opposing judicial decisions, and encouraging reliance on the 
finality of those decisions). 
 178. Admittedly, the Beets analysis could be read as not confusing Heck and collateral 
estoppel, but as using them in a two-tiered approach. First, the court determines that Heck 
applies. Once it concludes that Heck applies, it uses collateral estoppel to justify prohibiting the 
claim since the habeas/§ 1983 intersection is not present. But this reading does not impact the 
analysis of this Comment. 
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state level, legitimate claims for violations of constitutional rights may 
go unrecognized and unresolved. 
When close cases such as Beets arise, § 1983’s “broad reach” 
suggests that the tie should go to the petitioner.179 It is better policy 
to allow an action for a violation of federal rights to proceed than to 
default to a position of preclusion. Plaintiffs with viable 
constitutional claims may never have the opportunity to litigate them 
in federal court because of the rigidity with which some courts are 
interpreting Heck. It is this author’s hope that the other circuits will 
learn from the mistakes of Beets and move away from the improper 





 179. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 503 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating 
that “congressional policy” indicates that “individual[s] not unaffected by the habeas statute” 
should be able to “take advantage of the broad reach of § 1983”). 
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